Social Science Statistics in the Courtroom: The Debate Resurfaces in McCleskey v. Kemp by Gronhovd, Sheri L.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 62 | Issue 4 Article 7
1-1-1987
Social Science Statistics in the Courtroom: The
Debate Resurfaces in McCleskey v. Kemp
Sheri L. Gronhovd
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sheri L. Gronhovd, Social Science Statistics in the Courtroom: The Debate Resurfaces in McCleskey v. Kemp, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 688
(1987).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol62/iss4/7
Social Science Statistics in the Courtroom: The Debate
Resurfaces in McCleskey v. Kemp
Today's courtroom scene differs significantly from 1897, when Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes foretold the emergence of statistical evidence into
the law.' The transformation of social studies into the social sciences
and the proliferation of data gathering and reporting2 partially facilitated
the increased reliance upon statistical evidence in the courtroom.3 Un-
fortunately, statistical data has been misused, and often not used when
appropriate.
4
The debate regarding the role of social science statistics in the court-
room recently came before the United States Supreme Court in McCleskey
v. Kemp, 5 heralded as the most significant death penalty case since the
Court's sanctioning of Georgia's death penalty statute in Gregg v. Geor-
gia.6 The defense had offered a social science survey, the Baldus Study,
7
1 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Hxv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897) ("For the rational study of law
the black letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics
and the master of economics."). See also Monahan & Waltier, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating
and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PENN. L. REV. 477, 477-78 n.2 (1986) (citing opinions of
the current Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court which used social science evidence to establish or
criticize a rule of law).
2 See M. KwErr & R. KwErr, CONCEPTS AND METHODS FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS 11-15 (1981).
3 The role of statistics in the courtroom expanded for a number of reasons: Growth in aca-
demic programs on statistics; recognition of statistics as an important tool for government and busi-
ness planning and forecasting; federal legislation requiring the reporting of statistical data in areas
of the law such as discrimination, environmental, criminal, and antitrust; and the availability and
ability of the personal computer to perform statistical computations. R. WEHMHOEFER, STATISTICS IN
LITIGATION: PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS FOR LAWYERS § 1.01, at 1 (McGraw-Hill Trial Practice Series)
(1985). The Federal Rules of Evidence relaxed the common law hearsay barrier to statistical evi-
dence. See FED. R. EvID. 702, 703, 803(24) and 804(b)(5) & infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
See also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985) ("helpfulness" under the Federal
Rules of Evidence includes a liberal basis for admissibility of scientific evidence).
4 See Comment,Judicial Use, Misuse, andAbuse of Statistical Evidence, 47J. URB. L. 165 (1970); infra
notes 96-141 and accompanying text.
5 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987). See infra notes 6-10, 27, 29, 41-52, 110-12, 114, 144, 151, 164 and
accompanying text & infra notes 18, 21, 58, 107. See also Comment, Statistical Evidence of Discrimination
in Eleventh Circuit Death Penalty Appeal: Will Spinkellink Ever Die?, 15 STETSON L. REV. 489 (1986)
(correct spelling of defendant's name was Spenkelink); Comment, McCleskey v. Kemp: Constitutional
Tolerance for Racially Disparate Capital Sentencing, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 295 (1987).
6 428 U.S. 153 (1976). "The ruling ended what death penalty opponents had called their last
sweeping constitutional challenge to capital punishment." N.Y. Times, April 24, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
7 Baldus, Pulaski, & Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the
Georgia Experience, 74J. CRIM. L. & C. 661 (1983). The Badus Study has been identified as "far and
away the most complete and thorough analysis of sentencing" ever conducted. McCleskey, 753 F.2d
at 907 n. I (Johnson, J., dissenting) (quoting the opinion of Dr. Richard Berk, member of the Na-
tional Academy of Science Panel overseeing research on criminal sentencing issues in order to set
standards for such studies). The "Baldus Study" really connotes two studies-the Procedural Re-
form Study and the Charging and Sentencing Study-on the dealings of the Georgia criminal justice
system pertaining to homicide and murder cases since the post-Furman v. Georgia (408 U.S. 238
(1972)) death penalty statute went into effect on March 28, 1973. Professors Baldus, Woodworth,
and Pulaski initially conducted the Procedural Reform Study, but because this study contained no
measures for strength of the state's evidence against the accused, a factor which Professor Baldus
believed could be significant, the courts concentrated on results from the Charging and Sentencing
Study. Unless otherwise stated, this note refers to the Charging and Sentencing Study as the
"Baldus Study."
to show systemic racial discrimination in the Georgia prosecutors' deci-
sions to seek the death penalty and Georgia juries' decisions to sentence
the defendant to death based on the victim's race.8 The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected this offer of statistical
proof.9 The Supreme Court, like the Circuit Court, assumed the validity
of the study but rejected the statistics as being insufficiently dispropor-
tionate to prove either intent to discriminate under the fourteenth
amendment or arbitrary application under the eighth amendment. 10 By
rejecting what it assumed constituted a valid study, the Supreme Court
has narrowed the use of social science statistics in death penalty trials
and appeals.
This note examines the proper and improper use of statistics. Part I
of this note briefly describes the scientific method used in social science
research; the Baldus Study will illustrate the various concepts applied to
a particular setting. Part II discusses the various tests of reliability for the
admission of scientific evidence" and analyzes specific instances and
areas in the law where the scientific method and statistical evidence have
been employed properly, improperly, or not used when proper to do so.
Part III identifies certain general problems stemming from the different
roles of the bar, judiciary, and expert. Part IV suggests means to im-
prove use of statistics in the courtroom and bridge the gap between the
legal community and the social science community. Part V concludes
8 Race-of-the-defendant, a constitutionally impermissible factor under the 14th amendment,
did not appear to affect sentencing in the first study, the Procedural Reform Study. In the second
study, the Charging and Sentencing Study, the race-of-the-defendant effect, though arguably present
in Fulton County where McCleskey stood trial, did not appear at a statistically significant level. Mc-
C/eskey, 753 F.2d at 895.
9 The district court rejected the study for two reasons: (1) the study was invalid because it did
not measure the problem adequately and contained methodological flaws, McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F.
Supp. 338, 354-64 (N.D. Ga. 1984); and (2) even had the study been valid, the disparate impact
failed to reach a level sufficient to establish discriminatory intent under the 14th amendment. Id. at
379. The Eleventh Circuit assumed the Study's validity, but also rejected the statistical evidence
because the impact did not appear disproportionate enough to show discriminatory intent under the
14th amendment. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 895-98 (11th Cir. 1985). For discussion of
what constitutes intent under the 14th amendment, see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (discriminatory intent may be established on basis of objec-
tive criteria; for example, disproportionate impact); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (offi-
cial action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate
impact); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other
than race, may emerge from state action even though the statute appears neutral on its face); Sulli-
van v. Wainwright, 721 F.2d 316 (l1th Cir. 1983); Adams v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1443 (l1th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984); and Smith v. Balkcom, 671 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 882 (1982).
Compare this standard to that required under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Supreme Court held that only discriminatory
effect need be shown in plaintiff's prima fade case, a result clearly allowing the use of statistics in
employment discrimination cases. See also Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1486 n.30 (11th Cir.),
aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (holds that when appropriate, the court may draw upon Title VII cases in
its analysis of 14th amendment cases where statistics are involved).
10 107 S. Ct. at 1778 ("In light of the safeguards ... the fundamental value ofjury trial... and
the benefits that discretion provides to criminal defendants, we hold that the Baldus study does not
demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias .... ").
11 This statement assumes that social science statistics constitute scientific evidence. See in/ra
notes 12-63 and accompanying text.
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that, although not appropriate in every setting, statistics should play a
valuable role in the courtroom.
I. The Scientific Method
The proper application of statistics in the law requires that the law-
yer acquire a basic understanding of statistics and their value to the prac-
tice of law.' 2 To handle scientific evidence competently and effectively,
the lawyer needs to know more than rules of evidence-he cannot de-
pend totally on the expert witness to develop statistical testimony that
will help the factfinder. The attorney needs a working knowledge of the
field in order to be able to develop or attack an expert's evidence.13 This
section gives an overview of statistics and the scientific method, followed
by illustrations of various concepts. Throughout this section, the Baldus
Study will provide examples.
The term "statistics" refers to the methods used to collect, organize,
summarize, analyze, and present data in addition to drawing valid con-
clusions from the results. 14 The scientific method, a research method
based on controlled experimentation,' 5 consists of four major stages:
Hypothesis formulation and research design, data collection and codifi-
cation, selection and application of statistical tests to the data gathered,
and interpretation and publication of the methodology and statistical
results. 16
A. Hypothesis Formulation and Research Design
The importance of formulating an hypothesis and structuring a re-
search design can be demonstrated by analogy to steps taken by the re-
sponsible traveler who is about to embark on a long trip. Just as the
traveler needs to know his destination and how to reach it, the researcher
must specify his hypothesis and develop a strategy to determine whether
to reject or accept the hypothesis.
The term "hypothesis" describes an untested theory which the re-
searcher thinks explains the pattern or relationship that the researcher
has observed in the real world. 17 An acceptable hypothesis must be test-
able; the researcher must be able to make observations which confirm or
12 R. WEHMHOEFER, supra note 3, § 2.01, at 7.
13 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 604 (3d edition 1984).
14 R. WEHMHOEFER, supra note 3, § 2.02, at 8.
15 D. VINSON & P. ANTHONY, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH METHODS FOR LITIGATION 40-41 (Con-
temporary Litigation Series 1985).
A number of treatises exist on this subject in the law: D. BARNES & J. CONLEY, STATISTICAL
EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION (1986); N. CHANNELS, SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODS IN THE LEGAL PROCESS
(1985); W. CURTIS, STATISTICAL CONCEPTS FOR ATORNEYS (1983); M. DEGROOT, S. FEINBERG &J.
KADANE, STATISTICS AND THE LAW (1986) [hereinafter M. DEGROOT]; J. LOEWEN, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN
THE COURTROOM (1982); STATISTICAL METHODS IN DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 69 (Statistics Text-
book and Monograph Series) (D. Kaye & M. Auckin eds. 1986); and R. WEHMHOEFER, supra note 3.
16 Reich, How to Evaluate an Expert's Statistical Analysis, 28 PRAC. LAW. 69, 70-75 (1982).
17 N. CHANNELS, supra note 15, at 28-50; M. KWEIT & R. KwErr, supra note 2, at 23; D. VINSON,
supra note 15, § 2.7, at 28-29; R. WEHMHOEFER, supra note 3, § 3.25, at 60. See also Kimball, Errors of
the Third Kind in Statistical Consulting, 52J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 133 (1958) (the most common research
error involves asking the wrong question).
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disprove the hypothesis. In addition, some logical reason must explain
the researcher's belief that the variables are related.18
The value of the research design rests on the fact that planning
forces the researcher to think" about and prievent possible problems
before they occur. The hypothesis itself furnishes the foundation for the
study and determines the structure and process necessary to test it.19
The research design identifies and operationalizes variables; 20 specifies
what data to collect and how to collect it; determines how to analyze the
data; and specifies the standard of verification-how the researcher
knows whether to accept or reject the hypothesis.
2 1
B. Data Collection and Codification: The Data Base
Statistics can be no more accurate and reliable than their data
base.22 The accuracy of the data base depends on proper collection and
codification techniques; much of the testimony in McCleskey concerned
this very issue.23
18 M. KwErr & R. KwErr, supra note 2, at 23-24; D. VINsoN, supra note 15, at 29. Professor
Baldus hypothesized that a defendant who murdered a white person more likely would receive the
death penalty than a defendant who murdered a black person, all other factors being equal. McCles-
key v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 887 (1 1th Cir. 1985); McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 353 (N.D. Ga.
1984). This hypothesis is logical and relevant for two major reasons: The history of racial discrimi-
nation in the South and the high incidence of blacks on death row.
The United States Supreme Court struck down the death penalty in 1972 because its arbitrary
and capricious application constituted "cruel and unusual punishment" under the 8th amendment.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Justice Douglas in his concurrence particularly noted the
presence of racial discrimination. Where a white and a black were codefendants, several instances
had occurred in which the white received life or a term of years, and the black received the death
penalty. Similarly, a convicted black had a greater chance of getting the death penalty than life or a
term of years. For whites and latins;just the opposite occurred. Id. at 250-51 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) (citing to Koeninger, Capital Punishment in Texas 1924-1968, 15 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 132, 141
(1969)). About the time when McCleskey's evidentiary hearing took place, blacks comprised 127 of
the United States population. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSiS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrrED
STATES: 1985 27 (105th ed. 1.984). Yet, blacks "and other" non-whites represented 512/1202
(42.6%) of the death row inmate population. Id. at 185.
19 N. CHANNELS, supra note 15, at 28.
20 To "operationalize" a variable means to assign an empirical indicator to the variable's possi-
ble values or outcomes. M. KwErr & R. KwErr, supra note 2, at 21, 165-74.
21 Id. at 163-64. A research design should answer six questions:
1. What concepts or variables will be used, and how will they be operationalized?
2. What relationships or patterns does the researcher believe exist among the variables?
3. How are the variables related to each other?
4. What data is needed to test the hypothesis, and how will this data be collected?
5. How will the data be stored?
6. How will the data be analyzed, and what standards will the researcher apply to accept or
reject the hypothesis?
Id. at 164.
Professor Baldus most likely operated according to a research design. The 42 page question-
naire, McCleskey, 580 F. Supp. at 355, the coding protocols specifying how the student data collectors
were to operationalize the factors, id. at 354-56, and the language of the district court itself indicate
the presence of a well-constructed research design. Id. at 353. Returning to the analogy of the trav-
eler, Professor Baldus knew his destination point and had planned which roads to take.
22 McCleskey, 580 F. Supp. at 354.
23 Id. at 354-60. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
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1. Data Collection
Before data can be gathered, the researcher must identify the level
of analysis, the unit of analysis, and the population or universe supplying
the data. 24 The researcher must also specify the type and quantity of
data he needs to test the hypothesis. Proper methodology at this stage
and in the data's codification will ensure a data base as accurate as hu-
manly possible.
25
The level of analysis determines whether the properties observed
pertain to individuals or collectives. The unwary individual who attrib-
utes group characteristics to the specific individual and vice versa commits
statistical error.2 6 Professor Baldus did not fall into this trap. His study
analyzed traits of the Georgia system, and he affirmed that he could not
conclude that McCleskey had been sentenced to death based on the sys-
tem's statistics.
27
The unit of analysis represents the actual object of the researcher's
study; the information in the study should describe the unit.28 In Profes-
sor Baldus' case, the unit of analysis focused upon the decision making
process in the charging and sentencing stages.
29
The researcher must identify the universe or population, the total
collective body to which the hypothesis applies and from which the data
will be collected.3 0 Whether to study only a part of the population, a
sample, or the entire population depends upon the size of the population
and the researcher's resources of time and money.At If a sample is used,
the researcher ideally wants a sample that mirrors the population-the
sample should represent the whole. Representativeness of the sample
depends on two factors: Size of the sample and the method used to draw
the sample.
3 2
Three considerations in addition to a researcher's resources deter-
mine the size of the sample: Variation, risk, and accuracy.3 3 Variation
refers to the amount of differentiation expected among the cases in the
sample; the fewer values a variable may represent, the smaller a sample
can be.3 4 Risk involves the degree of toleration of error in assigning the
findings of the sample to the population as a whole; less toleration of
error requires a larger sample.33 Normally, a social science researcher
24 M. KwErr & R. KwErr, supra note 2, at 178-79.
25 See infra notes 32-52 and accompanying text regarding inaccuracies due to sampling bias, in-
complete data, and miscodification.
26 M. KWEIT & R. KwErr, supra note 2, at 179.
27 McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 895. McCleskey and his codefendants were robbing a furniture store
when the victim, a white police officer, interrupted them. McCleskey allegedly shot and killed the
officer. Because only ten cases in Fulton County involved a police officer victim, Baldus could say
that only a possibility existed that race-of-the-victim was a factor in McCleskey's case.
28 N. CHANNELS, supra note 15, at 40; M. KwErr & R. KWErr, supra note 2, at 179.
29 McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 887.
30 M. KwErr & R. KwErr, supra note 2, at 179; D. VINSON, supra note 15, at 78-79; R.
WEHMHOEFER, supra note 3, § 3.16, at 78-79.
31 M. KWErr & R. KwErr, supra note 2, at 179-80.
32 Id. at 180; R. WEHMHOEFER, supra note 3, § 3.17, at 78.
33 M. KwErr & R. KwErr, supra note 2, at 180.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 181.
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tolerates up to a five percent chance of random error.3 6 Accuracy means
the degree of precision desired, with higher accuracy requiring a larger
sample.
3 7
In drawing samples, researchers prefer probability sampling because
everyone or everything in the population maintains an equal or known
chance of being selected, thus minimizing bias.38 Basically, four types of
probability sampling can be identified: Simple random, systematic, clus-
ter, and stratified random.3 9 Stratified random sampling divides the pop-
ulation into subgroups or stratas and then draws a random sample from
each strata.40 The Baldus Charging and Sentencing Study used a two-
tiered stratified random sample. The first tier involved separating the
homicide population into murder cases with life sentences and voluntary
manslaughter cases. In each of these groups, researchers randomly
chose twenty-five percent of the population and added all death penalty
cases to this sample. The second tier drew eighteen cases from each ju-
dicial circuit in Georgia-a geographical stratification.4 1 The Charging
and Sentencing Study relied on a random stratified sample from a uni-
verse of about 2500 defendants who had been convicted of murder or
voluntary manslaughter. 42 The sample included 1,066 cases, a size which
usually combats dangers of variation, risk, and inaccuracy.43 Signifi-
cantly, neither the courts nor the state's experts found fault with Profes-
sor Baldus' sampling technique.4" On the other hand, in Baldus'
Procedural Reform Study, no sample of the cases was drawn. The re-
searchers instead studied the entire population of those convicted of
murder at a guilt trial and of those who pled guilty and received the
death penalty.4
5
The researcher must gather and then control for all variables which
may be relevant. Gathering data on even remotely relevant variables will
help rule out alternative explanations for the results. For example, Pro-
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 182.
39 Id. at 182-85. Professor R. Wehmhoefer defines a "simple random sample" as a sample se-
lected so that every member of the population maintains an equal chance of being selected as do all
possible samples that could be chosen. R. WEHMHOEFER, supra note 3, § 3.18, at 51. Systematic
sampling occurs when the researcher selects the first element randomly and then draws every nth
case. The researcher should use this type of sampling only if she knows that the population is or-
dered in a random manner. Id. The researcher combines two or more sampling procedures in
cluster sampling. The researcher usually follows the procedure of first drawing a random sample
from a collection or cluster of units. In the second stage, a random sample of cases from each cluster
is drawn. Id.
40 Id. § 3.18,at 51.
41 McCllkey, 580 F. Supp. at 354. Where the geographical area, the circuit, did not produce
eighteen cases in the first draw, additional cases were randomly drawn and added to the original
random sample. Id.
42 Id. at 353.
43 S. SUDMAN, APPLIED SAMPLING 86-87 (1976) (a good "rule of thumb" for a national sample
ranges from 1500 to 2500; for a smaller study, 500 to 1000 cases is the norm).
44 McC!ekey, 580 F. Supp. at 353-60. The Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court did not delve
into the merits of the study; each assumed the validity of the research but held the disparity to be
insufficient to establish discriminatory intent. McCkkey, 753 F.2d at 894; 107 S. Ct. at 1769.
45 McCkskey, 580 F. Supp. at 353.
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fessor Baldus' exhaustive questionnaire contained 595 variables which he
thought might explain the disparity in sentencing.
46
2. Codification
The problems discussed in gathering an accurate data base so far
have not been easily discernible. In contrast, the lay person can detect
more readily problems which occur in the codification stage. Codifying
data involves assigning numbers to represent characteristics, qualities,
attitudes, or other factors. 47 Coded data, however, cannot grasp the nu-
ances in every case. The district court in McCleskey quickly adopted the
argument that the coding process failed to capture the extent of the ag-
gravating or mitigating nature of the circumstances in each case. Certain
questions limited responses, and where responses were limited, the stu-
dent coded the questionnaire in the order in which the student discov-
ered the presence of the factor. As a result, the factors coded present
were not necessarily the most important.48 The district court ruled that
these circumstances defeated the assumption that Baldus compared simi-
lar cases because, in any study attempting to identify a cause/effect rela-
tionship between a factor and result, similar cases must be compared.49
In a second major problem, some of the questionnaires clearly were
miscoded. The state's expert compared the 361 cases which appeared in
both studies. He found that in the thirty variables examined, mismatches
occurred in twenty-eight. 50 In fifty percent of the cases, mismatches
46 Id. at 355. The information sought included location of the crime, details of all charges
against the defendant, outcome of the case, existence of a plea bargain, characteristics of the defend-
ant, information on contemporaneous offenses, details concerning every victim, details of the of-
fense, statutory aggravating factors, defendant's role vis-a-vis codefendants', outcome of
codefendants' cases, other aggravating circumstances, defendant's defense at trial, and strength of
evidence. Id. Because of the incomplete and summary nature of the Parole Board records, the
Charging and Sentencing Study contained no data on the prosecutor's perception of a witness' cred-
ibility. Id. at 357.
47 M. KwErr & R. KwErr, supra note 2, at 213; D. VINSON, supra note 15, at 34. The district court
in McCleskey found fault with the Baldus Study in the codification phase. 580 F. Supp. at 356 & infra
notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
48 McCleshey, 580 F. Supp. at 356. The principal data source of the Baldus Study consisted of
records from the Georgia Dept. of Pardons and Paroles, supplemented with information from the
Bureau of Vital Statistics, Dept. of Offender Rehabilitation, and questionnaires returned from law-
yers and prosecutors. Records from the Dept. of Pardons and Paroles included a summary report
prepared by a parole officer post-conviction, a FBI rap sheet, personal history evaluation, and, in
about 25%o of the cases, the actual police report. Id. at 355.
The research students responsible for filling out the questionnaires were instructed to follow a
written protocol to resolve ambiguities in the raw data base: (1) ambiguity ought to be resolved in a
direction which supports the factfinder; and (2) ambiguity ought to be resolved to support the legiti-
macy of the sentence. Id. at 355-56. Many researchers throw out those cases which are ambiguous
or contain incomplete data; Professor Baldus did not. Id. at 360. However, by resolving ambiguities
in a manner favoring the factfinder and sentence, he stacked the deck against his hypothesis.
49 Id. at 364.
50 Id. at 357.
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arose concerning the number of death-eligible factors. 51 The district
court thus found the data base substantially flawed.
52
C. Selection and Application of Statistical Tests
Generally, statistics fall into three categories: Summary, descriptive
statistics; 53 inferential statistics; 54 and probability statistics.55 Descriptive
statistics summarize data on the basis of measures of central tendency
(mean, median, and mode) and measures of dispersion (range, deviation,
and variance).56 Inferential statistics provide a statement of the degree
of expected accuracy of the descriptive statistics (i.e., the representative-
ness of the sample).
5 7
51 Id. Other important mismatches include:
Number of Prior Felonies 33%
Immediate Rage Motive 15%
Execution Style Murder 18%
Unnecessary Killing 18%
Defendant Additional Crimes 16%
Bloody 28%
Defendant Drug History 25%
Victim Aroused Fear in the
Defendant 16%
Two or More Victims in All 80%
Victim is a Stranger 12%
Id. Initially, each variable could take one of four responses. If the factor was definitely present, it
was coded 1. If the file indicated presence, it was coded 2. If the factor definitely was not present, it
was left blank. Finally, if the factor could equally be present or absent, it was coded U. Id. at 356.
The Laboratory for Political Research at the University of Iowa cleaned the data before entering it
into the computer. If an impermissible code showed up, a student research assistant recoded the
questionnaire after reading the file. Id. The data then was recoded so that either the factor was
present or absent (keep in mind that when the data was initially coded, ambiguity was to be resolved
against Baldus' hypothesis). Id. The district court made much of the way researchers dealt with
factors coded possibly present, possibly absent. Instead of recoding to show absent, the court said
the data should have been recoded to show present. Id. at 357. But this would contradict the policy
of initially coding to support the decision of the factfinder and the sentence. Also, Baldus recoded
for a worst case analysis on some models and found that the recoding had no effect on the racial
coefficients. Id. at 359. On appeal,Judge Johnson argued that "[s]everal of the imperfections noted
by the district court were not legally significant because of their minimal effect." 753 F.2d at 915
(Johnson, J., dissenting) ("The relatively small amount of missing data ... should have led the court
to rely on the study.").
52 McCleskey, 580 F. Supp. at 360.
53 N. CHANNELS, supra note 15, at 182-219; M. KwErr & R. KwErr, supra note 2, at 233-54; D.
VINSON, supra note 15, at 87-120; R. WEHMHOEFER, supra note 3, §§ 2.01-2.30, at 6-37.
54 N. CiANNELS, supra note 15, at 220-54; M. KwErr & R. KWErr, supra note 2, at 255-79, 299-
326; D. VINSON supra note 15, at 217-324; R. WEHMHOEFER, supra note 3, §§ 3.01-4.13, at 38-85.
55 In this context, "probability statistics" refers to the "product rule" and Bayesian theory (a
topic beyond this note and the Baldus Study). The leading case criticizing use of Bayesian theory
and the "product rule" is People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968). See
infra notes 74, 97-109, 138-40 and accompanying text. For critique on the use of this statistical
theory, see generally Brilmayer & Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U.
CHI. L. REv. 116 (1978); Callen, Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits on the Use of Bayesian Theory in
Evidence Law, 57 IND. LJ. 1 (1982); Cohen, Subjective Probability and the Paradox of the Gatecrasher, 1981
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 627; Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. REv.
1329 (1971); Note, Demographic Evidence in Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REv. 499 (1987). But see
Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1970); Kaye,
Paradoxes, Gedanken Experiments and the Burden of Proof. A Response to Dr. Cohen's Reply, 1981 ARIz. ST.
L.J. 635; Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. Cm. L. REv. 34 (1979).
56 See supra note 53.
57 See supra note 54.
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Each category of statistics exhibits different characteristics and pur-
poses which determine the type of statistical analysis the researcher per-
forms. Therefore, research and proper application necessitate
knowledge of the peculiarities and purposes of each statistical test. For
example, inferential statistics particularly help researchers in determin-
ing the significance of cause/effect studies such as the Baldus Study.
58
D. Interpretation and Publication
Social scientists recognize that their science remains a "soft" or in-
exact science regardless of the availability of sophisticated statistical
tests. Consequently, researchers rely on their colleagues to keep testing
their research and theories. The very strength of the scientific method
stems from the realization that scientists may be biased, consciously or
58 The Baldus Study combined both descriptive and inferential statistics to test the hypothesis.
The Study employed multiple regression analysis, a method of analysis which allows the researcher
to observe one factor (i.e., race-of-victim) while controlling for the effects of other factors. See gener-
ally D. BARNES &J. CONLEY, supra note 15, §§ 8.0-8.24, at 403-96; W. CuRmTs, supra note 15, at 165-
67; D. VINSON, supra note 15, § 10.1, at 259-63.
Baldus constructed a number of models using a range of 39 to 250 variables. McCleskey, 580 F.
Supp. at 361. The 230 variable model indicated that the race-of-the-victim factor explained 6% of
the variance in all the cases, and in the mid-range cases where McCleskey's case fell, race-of-victim in
jury verdicts accounted for 20% of the variance. Id. at 367. Professor Baldus, comporting with
proper methodology, reported these results with a test of significance of .05, representing a likeli-
hood of 5 times out of 100 that the statistical conclusions resulted from mere chance. Id. Actually,
Professor Baldus reported his results conservatively since the true level of significance was .02. Id. at
362. But see Lempert, Statistics in the Courtroom: Building on Rubinfeld, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1098, 1098-
1103 (1985) (both more and less conservative standards than the .05 level can be appropriate de-
pending on the nature of the issue); Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1048,
1050-63 (1985) (same).
The district court rejected Dr. Baldus' 230 variable model for two reasons. First, the r2 value
was only .46-.48 which means the model could predict the correct result in each case in the sample
46-48% of the time. McCleskey, 580 F. Supp. at 361. The court suggested that qualitative differences
in strength of evidence, in aggravating and mitigating factors, and quantitative differences in defend-
ants (looks, clothes, remorse, and personality) could explain the remaining 52% as well as part or all
of the 46-48% explained by the model. Id. at 359-60. Judge Johnson, dissenting on appeal, pointed
to another regression technique which found the race-of-victim factor to explain as much as 70-90%
of the variance. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 917 (Johnson, J., dissenting). He also attacked the majority
for their failure to address the 20% difference in mid-range cases like McCleskey's where the jury
excercised a great deal of discretion. Id. at 913-14. The majority held that even if the 20% figure
were shown to be valid, such a disparity in the mid-range cases could not serve to attack the system
as a whole. Id. at 898. The trial court found the model from which this figure derived underinclu-
sive. McCleskey, 580 F. Supp. at 375. See also supra note 51.
Second, the district court rejected the results because the research indicated the presence of
multicolinearity among the variables. All of the experts except Dr. Berk agreed that multicolinearity,
a degree of interrelationship among two or more variables which may distort the relationships, make
interpretation difficult, and reduce statistical significance (M. KwErr & R. KWErr, supra note 2, at 319-
20, 324, 355), existed in the data variables. McCleskey, 580 F. Supp. at 363-64. One of McCleskey's
experts testified that such multicolinearity actually dampened the effect of the observed racial vari-
ables. Id. at 364. The trial court rejected this assertion because it disagreed with the major premise
of the expert's conclusion that the Study compared cases with similar levels of aggravation and miti-
gation. The court rejected the assumption that the indices truly represented the degree of aggrava-
tion or mitigation. Id. See also supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text. The trial court thus
concluded that white victim cases become the proxy for aggravated cases and black victim cases
become the proxy for mitigated cases. Id.
The inclusion in this discussion of a single statistical test, multiple regression analysis, illustrates
both the practical application and some of the difficulties associated with complex cause/effect stud-
ies. Many other statistical tests do exist, but their discussion is beyond this note. See generally sources
cited supra note 15.
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unconsciously, in their observations. The recognition of this fact de-
mands that any subjective elements the researcher brings to the study be
published to the scientific community. This "intersubjectivity" in the so-
cial sciences requires the researcher to expose his bias.59
Social scientists evaluate a research study in two different lights: Va-
lidity and reliability. Validity refers to whether the indicators actually
measure what they are supposed to measure. The scientific community
scrutinizes the research for: (1) any unidentified, uncontrolled, or inter-
dependent variables which may undermine validity; (2) the possibility
that the sample resulted from mere chance; (3) any missing data which
could skew the results; and (4) any coding error or bias permeating the
results.60 The social science community attempts to curb bias in a
number of ways: Creating a climate of intersubjectivity; placing an ethi-
cal duty of honesty in reporting both supporting and contradictory data;
and clearly reporting procedures and results so that other researchers
can evaluate the validity of the methodology and interpretation.
6 1
Reliability refers to the consistency of the results. The most com-
mon method to establish reliability follows the test-retest approach.
Under the test-retest approach, other researchers either attempt to du-
plicate the results (conduct the study exactly as the first reseacher did on
the same data set) or replicate (test the hypothesis the same way but on a
different though similar data set).62 Professor Baldus' Study did not initi-
ate the study of racial factors in the sentencing process. The Gross &
Mauro Study on death sentencing patterns in Florida revealed a race-of-
the-victim factor.63 Someone likely will try to improve on the Baldus
Study in those areas where the district court found fault.
II. Admission and Application of Statistics in the Law
Courts receive statistical evidence in one of two ways: (1) without
the rigors of an evidentiary hearing or (2) subject to tests of relevancy,
authenticity, probativeness, and credibility,65 unless the content of the
statistics warrants judicial notice. 66 Statistical evidence has appeared in a
59 M. KwErr & R. KwErr, supra note 2, at 165; D. VINSON, supra note 15, at 41.
60 See generally M. KwErr & R. KwErr, supra note 2, at 233-325 & supra notes 22-52.
61 M. Kwarr & R. KwErr, supra note 2, at 331-32.
62 Id. at 165-66.
63 Gross & Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homi-
cide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 105 (1984). See also Bowers, The Pervasiveness of Arbitrariness and
Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 74.J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1067 (1983); Bowers
& Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DEUIN9. 563
(1980); Jacoby & Paternoster, Sentencing Disparity and Juy Packing: Further Challenges to the Death Pen-
alty, 73 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754 (1983); Fadelet & Vandiver, The Florida Supreme Court and
Death Penalty Appeals, 74J. CruM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754 (1983); Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration
of the Death Penalty: The Florida Experience, 95 HARv. L. REv. 456 (1981).
64 See generally Fowler v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 904 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976);Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); and Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
65 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 580 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
66 Federal Rule of Evidence 20 1(b) states that "[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject
to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned." See infra notes 75-95 and accompanying text (dangers for ajudge
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number of areas in the law, including employment discrimination;67 anti-
trust;6 8 tort damages; 69 environmental; 70 trademark;
7 1 rate regulation;72
constitutional issues such as jury composition, equal protection, and vot-
ing issues; 73 and most controversially, in criminal law.
74
to accept statistics without the rigors of an evidentiary hearing). But see Monahan & Walker, Social
Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PENN. L. REV. 477 (1986)
(authors argue that rather than treating statistics as "fact" they should be treated in the same man-
ner as legal precedent).
67 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that disproportionate impact is
sufficient to state a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964). See also Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Davis v. Cook, 80 F. Supp. 443 (N.D. Ga. 1948), rev'd, 178 F.2d
595 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 811 (1950). See generally D. BARNES &J. CONLEY, supra note
15, at 586-95; M. DEGROOT, supra note 15, at 1-40, 107-68; R. WEHMHOEFER, supra note 3, §§ 10.01-
20, at 144-78; STATISTICAL METHODS IN DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION, supra note 15; Campbell, Regres-
sion Analysis in Title VII Cases: Minimum Standards, Comparable Worth, and Other Issues Where Law and
Statistics Meet, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1299 (1984); Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of Multiple Regression
Studies in Race and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 737 (1980); Gwartney, Asher, Haworth
& Haworth, Statistics, the Law and Title VII, 54 NOTRE DAME LAw. 633 (1979); Hashimoto & Kochen, A
Bias in the Statistical Estimation of the Effects of Discrimination, 18 ECON. INQUIRY 478 (1980); McCabe, The
Interpretation of Regression Analysis Results in Sex and Race Discrimination Problems, 34 AM. STATISTICIAN
212 (1980); Shoben, The Use of Statistics to Prove Intentional Employment Discrimination, 46 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 221 (1983); Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical
Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1975); and Note, Title VII, Multiple Linear Regression Models
and the Courts: An Analysis, 46 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 283 (1983).
68 See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v.
Monsanto Corp., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Ciro 1982), aft'd, 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Chicken Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,485 (N.D. Ga. 1980); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aft'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); In re Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8 (1982).
See also D. BARNES &J. CONLEY, supra note 15, at 576-83; M. DEGROOT, supra note 15, at 49-106, 289-
303; R. WEHMHOEFER, supra note 3, §§ 20.01-20.04, at 389-92; Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48
U. CHI. L. REV. 886, 901-04 (1981); Finkelstein & Levenbach, Regression Estimates of Damages in Price-
Fixing Cases, 46 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 145 (1983); Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 702, 726-29 (1980); Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L.
REV. 937 (1981); Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1048 (1985); Rubinfeld
& Steiner, Quantitative Methods in Antitrust Litigation, 46 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 (1983).
69 SeeJones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983); United States v. English, 521
F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1975); and Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 546 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
aft'd, 717 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1983). See also D. BARNES &J. CONLEY, supra note 15, at 549-52; M.
DEGROOT, supra note 15, at 197-239; and R. WEHMHOEFER, supra note 3, § 22.01-23.07, at 405-40.
70 See Kamp v. Hernandez, 752 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1985); Asarco, Inc. v. OSHA, 746 F.2d 483
(9th Cir. 1984); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042
(1980); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910
(1978); Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir.
1975); Orchard View Farms v. Martin Marietta Aluminum, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 984 (D. Or. 1980). See
also D. BARNES &J. CONLEY, supra note 15, at 567-72; M. DEGROOT, supra note 15, at 417-47; and R.
WEHMHOEFER, supra note 3, §§ 16.01-17.16, at 306-49.
71 See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 571 F. Supp. 763 (D. Conn. 1983); Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v.
Royal Bank of Canada, 525 F. Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 216
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 606 (N.D. Cal. 1982), modified, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 525 (9th Cir. 1984); Amstar
Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 128 (N.D. Ga. 1979), rev'd, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
969 (5th Cir. 1980). See also D. BARNES &J. CONLEY, supra note 15, at 552-56.
72 See R. WEHMHOEFER, supra note 3, § 19.01-19.07, at 370-88.
73 See generally STATISTICAL METHODS IN DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION, supra note 15; R.
WEHMHOEFER, supra note 3, §§ 14.01-14.15, at 254-75.
74 See People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968) (Court rejected
statistical proof of guilt based on several characteristics appearing together because the statistical
testimony lacked foundation to support the table of trait probabilities assumptions of independence
among the several traits not proven and eyewitness was not positive of all traits.). See infra notes 97-
109, 138-40, supra note 55 and accompanying text. For a good discussion of Bayesian statistics, see
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A. Standards of Admission
The hearsay exception created for scientific evidence 75 rests on the
reliability of the evidence. Reliability of the underlying principles, tech-
niques, and operation of the process stands as the key factor for admis-
sion because, as a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness, 76
reliability substitutes for cross-examination. Assuming that statistics
constitute scientific evidence,77 the proponent of this evidence must de-
termine the standard of reliability.
Courts in the United States operate under one of three tests of relia-
bility: The Frye "general acceptance" test;78 the "verifiable certainty"
test;79  and the Federal Rules of Evidence/McCormick "helpful-
ness/relevancy" test.8 0 The majority of courts follow the Frye test, but an
increasing number of courts have turned to one of the other tests.8'
In Frye v. United States,8 2 the District of Columbia Circuit refused to
admit evidence, offered by the defendant, which consisted of a successful
lie detector test.8 3 In addition to satisfying the traditional requirements
of relevancy and helpfulness, the court imposed a special rule for scien-
tific evidence: "[T]he thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particularfield
in which it belongs."
8 4
Advocates of the Frye test assert that this test best assures uniformity
in evidentiary rulings; shields juries from the inclination to treat novel
scientific evidence as infallible; and avoids complex, costly litigation.8 5
Critics argue that these objectives can be reached under a more liberal
approach and point to two weaknesses of the Frye test: No working defi-
Cohen, supra note 55. Regarding the use of statistics in capital sentencing, see sources cited supra,
note 63. See also Goodman, Demographic Evidence in Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 499 (1987).
75 Federal Rule of Evidence 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or infer-
ence may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
76 Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5) provide a general hearsay exception if
among other requirements, the statement has "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness." Courts may find a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness where situations "demonstrate
a trustworthiness within the spirit of the specifically stated exceptions." FED. R. EVID. 803(24) advi-
sory committee note.
77 See supra notes 12-63 and accompanying text.
78 Frye v. United States, 283 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying
text.
79 See State v. Olivas, 77 Ariz. 118, 267 P.2d 893 (1954); People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100,
126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1975); Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 292 S.E.2d 389 (1982);Jenkins v. State, 156
Ga. App. 387, 274 S.E.2d 618 (1980). See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
80 FED. R. EVID. 702; MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 203, at 608.
81 McCoRMicK, supra note 13, § 203, at 604-09 (documents the history of this trend).
82 238 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
83 Id. at 1013. The systolic blood pressure deception test employed in this case is an ancestor of
the modem day polygraph test. Frye, on trial for murder, tried to prove his innocence based on
successful completion of this test.
84 Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).
85 MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 203, at 608 n.25. See generally Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel
Scientific Evidence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980).
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nition of either "general acceptance" or the relevant scientific
community
8 6
Under the "verifiable certainty" test, the trial court determines relia-
bility of the evidence available to the court and considers general accept-
ance in the community as a factor of weight, not admissibility. The court
may make its detemination of "verifna be certainty" on the basis of evi-
dence presented by the parties, treatises, or the rationale of cases within
and without its jurisdiction.8 7 The "verifiable certainty" test, like the Frye
test, 8 fails to focus primary attention on the helpfulness of the evidence.
A danger also exists that ajudge will find "verifiable certainty" where the
technique is too new and untested and where the test results appear too
inconclusive to be used in court.8 9 Finally, confusion in the courts may
arise from this ad hoc approach, especially where the judge lacks a solid
understanding of statistics. 90
The Federal Rules of Evidence/McCormick test remains the tradi-
tional test of relevancy and helpfulness to the trier of fact.9 1 For McCor-
mick, the standard of acceptance required by Frye does not determine
admissibility. Rather, general acceptance constitutes just one factor
92 of
reliability as well as grounds for judicial notice in some circumstances.
93
The relevancy/helpfulness approach should govern the admission of
statistics into the courtroom. As McCormick reasoned:
In so treating the yeas and nays of the members of a scientific disci-
pline as but one indication of the validity, accuracy, and reliability of
the technique, the traditional balancing method focuses the court's at-
tention where it belongs-on the actual usefulness of the evidence in
light of the full record developed on the power of the scientific test.94
With statistics typifying an esoteric technique for the layperson, this ap-
proach emphasizes reliability in terms of the accuracy and validity of the
principles, techniques, and actual applications, while a general accept-
ance standard creates an aura of infallibility. 95 An examination of spe-
cific evidentiary attacks on statistical evidence reveals the necessity for
86 MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 203, at 608 n.28. See generally 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 105 (1977).
87 Harper, 249 Ga. at 525, 292 S.E.2d at 395.
88 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
89 MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 203, at 606.
90 See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
91 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides in relevant part: "If scientific... knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert ... may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Federal Rule of Evidence 401 and 403 define
relevancy as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
... more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence," (FED. R. EVID. 401), if its
probative value is not "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless pre-
sentation of cumulative evidence" (FED. R. EVID. 403). McCormick agrees with this standard and
states: "Any relevant conclusions supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless
there are distinct reasons for exclusion. These reasons are the familiar ones of prejudicing or mis-
leading the jury or consuming undue amounts of time." MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 203, at 608.
92 MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 203, at 609.
93 Id. at 608.
94 Id. at 609.
95 Id.
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the legal profession to scrutinize each offer of proof under standards of
relevancy and helpfulness.
B. Application of Statistics
Any study can be attacked in four basic areas: (1) inappropriateness
or irrelevancy to the issue in the case; (2) flawed data base due to clerical
errors, unreliable or incomplete data source, or imperfect data collection
procedures; (3) sampling bias; and (4) imperfect statistical analysis, in-
cluding incorrect assumptions, wrong tests, and incorrect interpreta-
tion. 96 The opportunity to apply one or more of these attacks will
depend on the study and the purpose the proponent wishes the evidence
to serve.
1. Inappropriate or Irrelevant Statistics
People v. Collins 97 best illustrates the "catch-all" attacks against statis-
tics, which include attacks founded upon this country's conception ofjus-
tice. In Collins, the State had introduced Bayesian "product rule" 98
statistics at trial to prove guilt-that the defendants, an interracial couple,
had committed a robbery. 99 As with the five other physical characteris-
tics, o00 a college mathematics instructor assigned the probability of an
interracial couple in a car. He then determined the probability of all six
of these characteristics occurring together to be one in twelve million. I0 '
The prosecution laid no foundation to show the accuracy of the
probabilities for each characteristic.10 2
In rejecting these statistics as proof of guilt, the California Supreme
Court held that: (1) no empirical evidence existed to support the assign-
ment of probabilities to each characteristic;10 3 (2) the characteristics were
interrelated and therefore yielded an artificially high probability; 0 4 (3)
the statistics prejudiced the jury and distorted the jury's factfinding abil-
ity;'0 5 and (4) a substantial chance existed that the defendants did not
possess all six characteristics imputed to them. 06
The first two reasons Justice Sullivan gave in the majority opinion
reflect flaws in Bayesian theory which have led others to criticize "prod-
96 Special Committee on Empirical Data in Legal Decision Making, Recommendations on Pre-trial
Proceedings in Cases with Voluminous Data, 39 REC. A.B. Crr N.Y. 49 (1984).
97 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968); supra notes 55 & 74 and infra notes 98-
109, 138-40 and accompanying text.
98 The product rule states that the probability of an occurrence equals the product of the
probabilities of each event. R. WEHMHOEFER, supra note 3, § 3.08, at 43. See supra note 55 (list of
articles on the product rule).
99 Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 325, 438 P.2d at 37, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
100 Id. The other characteristics included: Partly yellow car; man with moustache; girl with pony
tail; girl with blonde hair; and Negro man with beard.
101 Id. at 327, 438 P.2d at 37, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 325, 438 P.2d at 36, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
105 Id. at 332, 438 P.2d at 41, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
106 Id. at 321-22, 438 P.2d at 34-35, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 498-99.
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uct rule" statistics. 107 Moreover, a theme appears throughout the opin-
ion that proving criminal guilt with statistics runs afoul with this
country's notions of individualized justice and presumption of inno-
cence. 10 8 In addition, the jurors in Collins failed to grasp the true value of
these statistics to the extent that these statistics actually clouded the
factfinding ability of thejury. 0 9 Collins not only points out flaws in Baye-
sian theory and the special nature of criminal proceedings; it reminds the
legal profession and the social science community of the limits upon the
use of statistics in the courtroom.
2. Inaccurate Data Base
A data base may contain flaws due to clerical errors, an unreliable or
incomplete data source, or imperfect data collection procedures. In Mc-
Cleskey, the trial court found the first two types of error and held the
whole study untrustworthy as a result. 110 The state's expert compared
361 cases which appeared in both the Procedural Reform Study and the
Charging and Sentencing Study and discovered a number of mismatches
reflecting either clerical error or an ambiguous data source, or both."'
The Gross and Mauro Study on racial patterns of capital sentencing
in Florida necessarily relied on a type of raw data base similar to the
Baldus Study in McCleskey. 112 In both, the researchers' study centered on
archival data gathered by others, often incomplete or summary in nature,
107 See supra notes 55 & 98 and accompanying text. See also McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 887-90; United
States v. Massey, 594 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1979) (regarding the probability that hair samples were
mistakenly identified in microscopic examination); Miller v. State, 240 Ark. 340, 399 S.W.2d 268
(1966) (unsubstantiated probabilities based on expert's unproven estimates of soil samples inadmis-
sible); State v. Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. 1987) (rejected the use of evidence in a rape case that
96.4% of the men in a metropolitan area could be eliminated as the source of semen (the defendant
was not included in this group) because the jury would likely use it as a probability measure of the
defendant's guilt); State v. Sneed, 76 N.M. 349,414 P.2d 858 (1966) (a one in 240 billion probability
that a real person fit defendant's alias and description held inadmissible to identify defendant with-
out first establishing foundations of the probabilities of each factor); People v. Risley, 214 N.Y. 75,
108 N.E. 200 (1915) (held inadmissible an expert's estimate of a one in four thousand million
probability that a different typewriter produced certain writing). See generally Annotation, Admissibil-
ity, in Criminal Case, of Statistical or Mathematical Evidence Offered for Purpose of Showing Probabilities, 36
A.L.R. 3d 1194 (1971). But cf. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132 (defendant drug manufacturers held liable for damages in proportion to its share of the
market when the plaintiff could not identify the exact manufacturer of the drug DES ingested by
plaintiff's mother during pregnancy and which the plaintiff alleged caused cancer to develop in her),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
108 See Note, Demographic Evidence in Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 499, 520-23 (1987).
109 Collins, 68 Cal. 2d at 325, 438 P.2d at 37, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 501. Regarding the unfamiliarity,
suggestibility and competency of jurors as to statistical evidence, see also United States v. Green,
548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(statistical proof may assume posture of "mystic infallibility"); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision
and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1334 (1971) ("the very mystery that surrounds
mathematical arguments-the relative obscurity that makes them at once impenetrable by the lay-
man and impressive to him-creates a continuing risk that he will give such arguments a credence
they may not deserve and a weight they cannot logically claim").
110 580 F. Supp. 338, 354-60. See also supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
111 Id. at 357. See also supra notes 50-52.
112 Gross & Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homi-
cide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27 (1984). See also supra note 48 and accompanying text. The raw
information researchers need to study the death penalty in detail can be found only in court and
corrections records.
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and all too often, ambiguous. Just as the McCleskey court attacked the
Baldus Study, courts in Florida have attacked the Gross and Mauro Study
for these flaws."
l 3
Although not a problem in McCleskey, 114 survey bias in a question-
naire appeared in Sears Roebuck Co. v. All States Life Insurance Co. i" 5 Sears,
owner of "Allstate" Insurance Company, sued "All States" Life Insur-
ance Company alleging infringement on its registered trademark, "All-
state." 1 6 To prove that the public confused "Allstate" and "All States,"
Sears sought to introduce results of a poll conducted on one thousand
impartially selected telephone subscribers. 117 The Fifth Circuit refused
to overrule the district court's ruling of inadmissibility because the sur-
vey questionnaire did not mention "All States" until after two questions
had called to mind "Sears & Roebuck."' " 8 The court found this strategy
self-serving, and lacking this evidence, Sears could not meet its burden of
proving similarity between the registered marks. 119
3. Sampling Bias
Drawing a representative sample depends upon taking a sufficiently
large probability sample from a properly identified population. 120 Many
of the faults associated with sampling stem from the failure to sample the
proper population. In Hazelwood School District v. United States,12 1 black
applicants denied employment brought a Tide VII action against St.
Louis, Missouri, school officials alleging employment discrimination
against qualified black teachers. The United States Supreme Court re-
manded the case to determine the relevant population, St. Louis County
113 Wainwright v. Ford, 734 F.2d 538 (lth Cir.), aft'd, 467 U.S. 1220 (1984); Wainwright v.
Adams, 709 F.2d 1443 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984).
114 The Baldus research consisted of content analysis-researching existing data to find patterns.
Survey bias occurs in gathering the raw data first hand from the individual in some form of question-
naire or interview. The questions can be biased in a number of ways: (1) inferring the "right"
answer; (2) wrongly presuming that the individual knows or should know the answer; (3) inferring
disagreement with the interviewees answer through preemptory, argumentative questions; (4) sug-
gesting that the interviewer is looking for a different answer by redundancy; (5) rephrasing the ques-
tion to suggest the desired answer; (6) suggesting the answers by the choices or in tonal inflection;
or (7) referring to prior answers to imply answers or limit the scope of the reply. M. KwErr, supra
note 2, at 198-207.
115 246 F.2d 161 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 894 (1957).
116 Id. at 161.
117 Id. at 171.
118 Id. The questionnaire presented the questions the following way:
I) What comes to your mind when I say the brand name "Westinghouse"?
2) What does the brand "Kodak" mean to you?
3) What does "Allstate" mean to you?
4) If you wanted "Allstate" insurance, where would you go?
5) Have you ever heard of "All States Life Insurance Company"?
6) Who would you say owns "All States Life Insurance Company"?
Id.
119 Id. at 172.
120 See supra notes 24-45 and accompanying text. See generally American Luggage Works, Inc. v.
United States Trunk Co., 158 F. Supp. 50 (D. Mass.), aft'd sub nom., Hawley Prod. Co. v. United
States Trunk Co., 259 F.2d 69 (lst Cir. 1957); Annotation, Surveys or Polls of Public or Consumers'
Opinion, Recognition, Preference, or the Like, 76 A.L.R. 2d 619, 638, 661-64 (1961).
121 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
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alone or St. Louis County and the City of St. Louis.1 22 If the former
labor market represented the relevant population, the disparity of black
qualified teachers compared to those hired constituted only two per-
cent.' 23 On the other hand, the inclusion of the City of St. Louis in-
creased the disparity to almost twelve percent.' 24 In remanding, the
Supreme Court directed the trial court to consider what the experience
in other St. Louis County districts indicated about excluding the city dis-
trict from the population.'
25
A sample smaller than thirty limits the researcher's ability to genera-
lize about the population because it does not lend itself easily to statisti-
cal manipulation.' 26 In Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality
League,12 7 a sample of thirteen people was not considered statistically sig-
nificant. 128 Likewise, in Ochoa v. Monsanto Co. ,129 where only one Mexi-
can-American was hired for fifty-six possible positions in a community
with ten percent Mexican-American representation, no prima facie case
of racial discrimination in Monsanto's hiring practice could be made
since only eleven Mexican-Americans applied for the positions.' 3 0 As a
matter of practice, research studies include more than thirty members in
the sample.13 1 Problems arise, as in Educational Equality League and Ochoa,
in small scale studies taken "after the fact."
One commentator noted that the sample selection of litigated cases
will be skewed because the plaintiffs and their attorneys perceive a high
probability of success.' 3 2 The shift away from academic research to for-
profit research firms in search of studies prepared for litigation purposes
may also skew the composition of litigated cases. Whether the sample is
skewed as a result of these factors, too small to be statistically significant,
or taken from the wrong population, a good research design could obvi-
ate most sampling bias.
4. Imperfect Statistical Analysis
One attorney who studied methods for cross-examining statistical
experts labels challenges of this sort procedural,' 3 3 challenges including
122 Id. at 299-303.
123 Id. at 311.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 312. The Supreme Court also directed the trial court to consider the history of St. Louis
City School District's hiring practices as far back as 1970, the extent that the hiring policies have
changed the racial composition of the teaching staff in that district, whether and to what extent did
St. Louis' practice divert teachers who might have otherwise applied to Hazelwood, and whether and
to what extent black teachers employed by St. Louis would prefer employment in districts like Hazel-
wood. Id.
126 M. KWEIT & R. KwErr, supra note 2, at 182.
127 415 U.S. 605 (1974). In reversing a finding of racial discrimination in the mayor's appoint-
ment of members to a School Board Nominating Panel, the U.S. Supreme Court found statistically
insignificant the proportional comparison between a 13 member panel and the city-wide proportion
of blacks. Id. at 621.
128 Id. at 621.
129 473 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1973).
130 Id. at 319-20.
131 D. VrNSON & P. ANrrHoNY, supra note 15, § 6.9, at 139-41.
132 Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1048, 1062 (1985).
133 Dawson, Cross Examination of the Quantitative Expert, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 294 (1982).
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incorrect assumptions, wrong tests, and incorrect interpretation.13 4
"Battles of the experts" arise in this context. In Coates v. Johnson &John-
son,'35 experts for both the plaintiff and defendant relied on the same
data, and yet reached opposite conclusions on the evidence of racial dis-
crimination by the defendant-employer. 136 Each expert then spent most
of the trial attacking the other's analysis.
137
People v. Collins '3 8 relied on Bayesian statistics, and in that regard,
many critics would argue that the State relied on research based on in-
correct assumptions.' 3 9 Most importantly, the State's expert failed to es-
tablish a foundation for the initial assignment of probabilities to each
characteristic, even though the theory itself relies on the unproven as-
sumption that the probability of an event is the product of the
probabilites of each characteristic.14
0
Again, a good research design could have prevented some of the
problems associated with identifying assumptions and applying the
proper tests. Incorrect interpretation and "battles of the experts" indi-
cate a need for knowledge, but in any event the court may appoint its
own expert pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
14 1
III. Explanations for Judicial Distrust of Statistics
On the surface, it appears that judges reject statistics for inaccura-
cies in the study, inappropriateness to the issue, or imperfect analysis.
142
However, in addition to and underlying these reasons lie two deeper ex-
planations: The nature of the judicial institution and the role conflict
between the judiciary and social science community.
A. Institutional Reasons
The appropriateness of statistics in any given case depends upon
whether they are directed towards legislatures, courts, or administrative
134 R. WEHMHOEFER, supra note 3, §§ 8.01-8.10, at 121-32.
135 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 32,664 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aft'd, 756 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1985).
136 756 F.2d at 536-49. Coates, a Negro, brought an individual and class action against his em-
ployer,Johnson &Johnson, following his dismissal for sleeping on thejob. The company had just
reinstated Coates from a suspension for damaging company property. Id. at 530. Coates alleged
that Johnson &Johnson operated under a plan to reduce black employees and treated blacks less
favorably than whites under a highly discretionary discipline-discharge-reinstatement system. Id.
Coates introduced several statistical studies purporting to illustrate a disparity in discharge rates for
black and white employees, as much as two times greater for blacks. Id. at 536-37.
Johnson & Johnson's expert attacked the studies for inaccuracy and also offered disciplinary
records as a nondiscriminatory explanation for the disparity. Id. at 537-38. Coates' expert coun-
tered by stating that a disciplinary record other than tardiness was not objective and that the discipli-
nary records reflect the discrimination. Both experts differed on whether to include data from
disciplinary records, what "discharge" meant, and whether the data could be considered one sample
rather than year-by-year samples. Id. at 537-40. In light of this battle and its own analysis of the
studies, the court affirmed the decision forJohnson &Johnson. Id. at 553. The court stated: "[W]e
believe that neither party offered a compelling statistical case .... " Id. at 548.
137 Id.
138 68 Cal. 2d 319,438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968); supra notes 55, 74, 97-109 and accom-
panying text.
139 See supra note 55.
140 Id.
141 FED. R. EvID. 706. See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 96-141 and accompanying text.
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agencies. 143 For example, the majority of the Supreme Court in McCles-
key decided that "McCleskey's arguments are best presented to the legis-
lative bodies"' 44 to weigh and evaluate with a flexible approach not
available to courts. The fact that courts function differently from these
other institutions often escapes the social scientists, experts, the bar,
and, sometimes, the judiciary.
1. Judicial Restraint
The judiciary long has practiced judicial restraint, believing it neces-
sary to maintain its power and status in society.' 4 5 A number of reasons
explain this phenomenon: Piecemeal adjudication; litigant-initiated and
litigant-controlled adjudication; belief that courts are a poor forum for
ascertaining social facts; and the finality of court decisions which leave
little room for policy review. 146 The final two reasons especially apply in
the context of social science data.
Because adjudication occurs in a piecemeal and litigant-controlled
fashion, the limited amount and type of information received by the
court in any case impedes the court's ability to ascertain social facts.
147
Understandably, a judge may feel ill-equipped to make policy based on
the facts in a single case:
The judicial process is too principle-prone and principle-bound ....
It is also too remote from conditions, and deals, case by case, with too
narrow a slice of reality. It is not accessible to all the varied interests
that are in play .... It [is] very properly independent. It is passive. It
has difficulty controlling the stages by which it approaches a problem.
It rushes forward too fast, or it lags .... For all these reasons, it is, in
a vast, complex, changeable society, a most unsuitable instrument for
the formation of policy.'
48
Most court decisions remain extraordinary, final events, contrary to
legislatures and administrative agencies that constantly review and
change decisions. This distinction suggests that the judiciary should be
less willing than other members of the political system to adopt contro-
versial techniques 49 and also reflects a need by the judiciary to resolve
disputes individually to maintain some flexibility without being tied to a
precedent which may not have general application.' 50  Thus, judges
rightly consider the impact not only upon the parties before them but
also upon future parties and society in general.
143 Brilmayer & Kornhauser, Review: Quantitative Methods and Legal Decisions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.
116, 124 (1978).
144 McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1781 (1987).
145 Roche, Judicial Self-Restraint, 49 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 722 (1955) ("Judicial self-restraint and
judicial power seem to be the opposite sides of the same coin: it has been by judicious application of
the former that the latter has been maintained."). See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803) (holding that § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the Supreme Court power beyond that
granted in Article III of the Constitution, thus establishing judicial review).
146 D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 33-56 (1977).
147 Id.
148 A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 175 (1970).
149 Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 143, at 126.
150 Note, Demographic Evidence in Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 499, 521-23 (1987).
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2. Thin and Slippery Ice
Judges may believe that a ruling legitimating statistics in one field
may open the door to their application in other fields. Justice Powell for
the majority in McCleskey echoed this fear: "If we accepted McCleskey's
claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing de-
cision, we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of
penalty.., and to claims based on unexplained discrepancies that corre-
late to membership in other minorit[ies], and even to gender."' 151 In ad-
dition, a judge willing to allow statistics in the case and issue presently
before the court may be wary of statistics extending beyond the original
ruling. 52
The very essence of sociological inquiry requires that scientists con-
tinually subject past studies to new modes of proof and set studies aside
when discredited.' 53 For a judge who has built a principle of law upon
such a discredited study, the result can be traumatic.154 Justice Mar-
shall's treatment of statistics regarding the deterrent effect of capital
punishment stands as proof. Marshall's concurring opinion in Furman v.
Georgia,' 55 striking down the death penalty, relied upon sources which
found that capital punishment did not deter criminal behavior.' 56 Four
years later, in Gregg v. Georgia,' 57 studies had found some deterrent effect.
Marshall again responded with the results of these and other studies.' 58
Less than two years later, the National Academy of Sciences determined
that both sets of data contained flaws, rendering both studies invalid.' 59
Marshall's situation indicates how discredited studies may undermine
and detract from the strength and reasoning of decisions relying upon
them and the danger that discredited studies present to judges.
3. The Adversary Proceeding: Battle of the Experts
Parties to an adversary proceeding rarely develop positions adverse
to their own, even though the best interpretation of statistical results
might run contrary to the interests of all parties before the court. Any
judge untrained in and unfamiliar with statistical methodology and tests
cannot be expected to recognize the inadequacy of the adversarial posi-
tions.' 60 Thus, even when the judicial application of statistics might be
proper, the nature of the forum may skew the reality of the situation.
151 107 S. Ct. at 1779-80 (footnotes omitted).
152 Dorin, Two Different Worlds: Criminologists, Justices and Racial Discrimination in the Imposition of
Capital Punishment in Rape Cases, 72 J. CRiM. LAw & CRIMINOLOGY 1667, 1686 (1981) ("Once the
Court legitimated such weapons, they would be turned loose upon the whole system. The result
would likely be a 'legal revolution' making the Warren years look like a retrenchment.").
153 Id. at 1675.
154 See Doyle, Can Social Science Data Be Used in Judicial Decisionmaking?, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 13, 18
(1977).
155 408 U.S. 238, 348-54 (1972) (Marshall, J, concurring).
156 Id.
157 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
158 Id. at 233-36 (Marshall. J, dissenting).
159 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PANEL ON RESEARCH DETERRENT AND INCAPACrrATIvE EFFCrs
8-9 (A. Blumenstein, J. Cohen, & D. Nagen eds. 1978).
160 Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 143, at 126.
1987] NO-FES
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
In addition, the judiciary may have become disillusioned by the fre-
quent battles between experts. Perhaps some view statistics with a high
degree of skepticism due to the fact that two experts sometimes manage
to derive conflicting interpretations from the same data.1 61 This phe-
nomena occurred in Coates v. Johnson &Johnson, 162 where two experts ar-
rived at opposite conclusions from the same study,1 63 and to some
extent, this also occurred in McCleskey regarding the presence and effect
of multicolinearity.164 The resulting confusion and mistrust experienced
by the judge and jury in this situation furthers the fear of and hostility
towards statistics, even helpful statistics which may get lost in the fight.
B. Role-Conflicts: A Lack of Understanding of Each Other's
Role and the Subject
Sociologists, criminologists, and other social scientists assert that be-
cause many judges have deficient social science backgrounds, they can-
not even begin to understand statistical methodologies and findings. 65
The sociologist may find himself in a serious dilemma. If he keeps his
studies simple, "he may sacrifice so much methodological potency as to
make them invalid." 1 66 On the other hand, if the researcher conducts a
complex study, those untutored in statistics may find the concepts diffi-
cult to grasp.
But each day the judiciary tackles many difficult areas of the law
where it possesses no expertise such as medicine, tax law, or securities
regulation. The communication gap does not rest solely with the judici-
ary. In fact, the attorneys and experts in this judicial system must inform
the factfinder in a meaningful way, and in this respect, they fail when the
factfinder becomes confused. In court, the attorney and expert witness
must adapt to the language and knowledge base of the factfinder, as well
as to the institutional atmosphere.1 67
IV. Effective Use of Statistics: Proposed Solutions
The magnitude, both perceived and real, of the problems associated
with statistical evidence in the courtroom has sparked discussion of pos-
sible solutions.' 68 The means for some solutions, the long-term solu-
161 See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
162 28 EmpI. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 32,664 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aft'd, 756 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1985); supra
notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
163 756 F.2d at 536-49.
164 McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 364 (N.D. Ga. 1984). All of the experts except one of
McCleskey's agreed that multicolinearity was present in the data. McCleskey's experts argued that
the net effect of multicolinearity would dampen the effect of observed racial variables. Id. On the
other hand, the State's expert and the district court found that the multicolinearity translated white-
victim cases into a proxy for aggravated cases and black-victim cases into a proxy for mitigated cases.
Id. See supra note 58.
165 Dorin, supra note 152, at 1671. "Judges and justices are largely products of a traditional
education not oriented toward science or mathematics, which is more suited to a pre-computer age."
Id. at 1672.
166 Id. at 1673.
167 See supra notes 143-61 and accompanying text.
168 See generally Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 143; Dorin, supra note 152; Doyle, supra note
154; Rubinfeld, supra note 132; Tribe, supra note 55.
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More education on the nature, proper use, and analysis of social sci-
ence statistics perhaps constitutes the most evident yet most difficult so-
lution. Members of the bar, whose duties include preparing the expert's
testimony and discrediting the opponent's expert, must develop a work-
ing knowledge of statistics. The judiciary needs to understand statistics
to fulfill its roles of "referee" and factfinder. An educated bar and judici-
ary would avoid much of the misapplication and misunderstanding of sta-
tistical results and would aid a jury in understanding the concepts and
methodology of statistics. With educated participants, the reliability and
validity of the statistics may be evaluated independently as they must be
to assure that only proper statistical evidence reaches the factfinder.
Some progress has been made toward this end. A number of trea-
tises have been published to aid the practicing bar in understanding sta-
tistical concepts as well as their practical application.1 69 However, even
with a more educated bar and judiciary, the need for the statistical expert
to understand the legal framework and adapt accordingly persists.
Therefore, workshops and treatises should teach not only the statistical
concepts to the legal profession but also the nature of the legal forum
and the attitudes and roles of the participants to the scientific
community.
2. Liberalized Discovery
Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703, 803(24), and 804(b)(5) make
introduction of expert testimony less difficult for the proponent by re-
moving many of the hearsay barriers to expert testimony. 170 Still, the
opponent to the introduction of statistical evidence at the present time
finds it difficult to conduct a thorough cross-examination. 1 7 1 The oppo-
nent needs time to study and perhaps engage his own expert to analyze
the statistics.1 72 To prevent surprise statistical evidence, pretrial discov-
ery must be liberalized, especially for the criminal defendant.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 provides more limited dis-
covery than does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) and (4).173
169 See generally supra note 15.
170 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides in relevant part: "Ifscientific... knowledge will assist
the trier of fact.., a witness qualified as an expert... may testify... in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." Federal Rule of Evidence 703 provides: "Ifofa type reasonably relied upon by experts
in the particular field ... the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence." Federal Rules of
Evidence 803(24)and 804(b)(5) provide generic exceptions to the hearsay rule if enumerated condi-
tions are met.
171 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
172 The costs associated with expert testimony run high. This raises a difficult question regarding
the funding of experts needed by indigents.
173 The proponents of liberal criminal discovery argue that the disparity in resources between the
criminal defendant and the government, the gravity of the liberty interests involved, and the diffi-
culty in preparing a defense for indigent defendants mandate relaxing the rules. Opponents of lib-
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Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(D), the defendant
may obtain results or reports of physical or mental examinations and of
scientific tests pretrial if material. To prevail under Rule 16(a) (1) (D), the
criminal defendant seeking discovery of social scientific evidence must
convince the court that this evidence is under the rubric "scientific test."
As well as protecting the government's work product,' 74 Rule
16(a) (2) prevents the defendant from obtaining statements made by gov-
ernment witnesses or prospective witnesses unless permitted by the
Jencks Act.' 75 Essentially, the defendant cannot obtain statements or re-
ports made by a government witness until the witness has testified at trial.
Thus, criminal discovery unfortunately operates under the "sporting the-
ory ofjustice" where suprise is a valid strategy. Especially where statisti-
cal evidence is involved, suprise and lack of time to prepare to combat
the statistics create severe injustice for the criminal defendant. Statistical
evidence and methodology should be disclosed automatically to the
criminal defendant pretrial.
Civil discovery embraces a broader scope, but the work product doc-
trine and "substantial need" test in Rule 26(b)(3) may prevent the oppo-
nent from getting the whole study. As suggested for criminal discovery,
one method of eliminating suprise would allow blanket discovery regard-
ing the methodology of the study. 176 Also, admissibility of the statistical
evidence could be resolved pretrial. 77 Either of these proposals would
help eliminate the unfairness of encountering a statistical study without
sufficient time to examine it thoroughly.
Potential means of resolving admissibility questions rest in Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 36 (requests for admissions)178 and 33 (inter-
rogatories).' 79 As discovery devices, these rules apply only to parties,
not to experts, but a limited extension of these rules to experts regarding
eral discovery contend that since no mutual exchange could occur given the defendant's 5th
amendment right and since the state must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant has
every advantage. Opponents also argue that liberal discovery would lead to fishing expeditions,
threats to witnesses, and increase occurrences of perjury. See S. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 697-722 (1984).
174 "[T]his rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other
internal government documents made by the attorney for the government or other government
agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case . FED. R. CRIM. P.
16(a)(2).
175 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1982) provides:
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or report in the
possession of the United States which was made by a Government witness (other than the
defendant) shall be the subject of subpena [sic], discovery, or inspection until said witness
has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.
176 Special Committee on Empirical Data in Legal Decision Making, Recommendations on Pretrial
Proceedings in Cases with Voluminous Data, 39 REC. A.B. Crry N.Y. 49 (1984).
177 Id.
178 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36 states: "A party may serve upon any other party a written
request for the admission, for purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within
the scope of Rule 26(b) ... that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to
fact .... "
179 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(b) states: "Interrogatories may relate to any matters
which can be inquired into under Rule 26(b) ...." Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) pro-
vides that "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the
party seeking discovery ....1"
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NOTES
the methodology and results of statistical tests would help prepare the
opponent to attack the validity and reliability of the study.
B. Short-Term Solutions
1. Working Within the Present Rules of Evidence
Federal Rule of Evidence 706 allows the court to appoint an expert
on its own motion or upon application by any party.18 0 The reasons ad-
vanced for the enactment of this rule include the practice of shopping
around for experts, the venality of some experts, and the reluctance of
some respected and reputable experts to testify.' 8 ' Although appoint-
ment occurs infrequently, the Committee contends that the availability of
the provision itself checks the zealousness and bias of a party's expert.' 8 2
If left to lie dormant, however, this rule will lose its strength. The federal
judiciary possesses the means to sort out the statistical evidence and
should not hesitate to exercise this power should a "battle of the ex-
perts" arise.
2. Understanding Each Other's Environment and Role
The legal and social science professions can bridge the communica-
tion gap between the judiciary and the scientific community by each un-
derstanding and respecting the other's role and institutional
framework.' 8 3 Very little can be done to remove the mass confusion re-
garding statistical evidence in the courtroom until this understanding de-
velops. An understanding could be developed through workshops
jointly sponsored by the American Bar Association and the National
Academy of Science or by local bar associations. In addition, the social
scientist preparing a study for litigation purposes and the attor-
ney/proponent, if working closely together, should develop an under-
standing of each other's environment to make each a more effective
participant in the courtroom.
V. Conclusion
Statistical evidence has carved itself a niche in the courtroom; the
size of the niche remains to be determined. The Supreme Court's ruling
in McCleskey narrows the use of statistics in death penalty cases and also
reflects the fears, distrust, and misunderstandings associated with statisti-
cal evidence. McCleskey also represents a narrow majority's commitment
to the death penalty regardless of the best evidence of discriminatory
application.
In the context of the Baldus Study in McCleskey, problems that arose
or could have arisen demonstrate the importance of strict adherence to
180 Federal Rule of Evidence 706 provides that "[tihe court may on its own motion or on the
motion of any party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed ....
The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert
witnesses of its own selection."
181 FED. R. EVID. 706 advisory committee note.
182 Id.
183 See Brilmayer & Kornhauser, supra note 143; Dorin, supra note 152.
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proper methodology and the role of a research design. The nature of the
judicial institution and role conflict with the social science community
exacerbates the reluctance to use statistics, but a common understanding
of each other's role and more education should decrease the misuse of
statistics and increase their proper use.
Statistical evidence plays an important role in the courtroom. It
should continue to do so as long as: (1) it meets traditional evidentiary
standards of legal relevancy; (2) it fulfills the validity and reliability re-
quirements; and (3) the participants (expert, attorney, judge) perform
their function of aiding the factfinder.
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